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In recent years, there have been a number of attempts to connect
enactivism with the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This essay is such an
attempt. Its major theme is the relationship between affectivity and
ethics. My touchstones in enactivist thought are Giovanna Colombetti
and Steve Torrances’ “Emotion and Ethics: an (inter-)enactive account”
(2009) and the influential concept of participatory sense-making
developed by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007).
With respect to Levinas, I deploy major insights from Totality and
Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I first show that enactivist thought
(thus represented) and Levinas roughly agree on three points: the
fundamentality of human affectivity; the ethical significance of affective
response to the other; the interpersonal nature of sense-making. I then
consider some difficulties with Colombetti and Torrance’s conception of
interaction-responsibility, which is based on De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s
formulation of interaction-autonomy, and use Levinas to draw attention
to the role of passivity and asymmetry in interaction in a way so far
overlooked by enactivist thinkers. Working through a problem case
yields insights for both perspectives. I argue, first, that ethics does not
arise from interaction but instead should be considered foundational for
interaction as such. Second, we must distinguish between a participant
and observer perspective on interaction in a way not yet carried out by
enactivist thinkers. Third, the method of enactivist research exemplified
by Colombetti and Torrance can help make phenomenologically
manifest important insights into Levinas’ difficult concept of “the third”.
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In recent years, there have been a number
of attempts to connect enactivism with the
thought of Emmanuel Levinas (Dierckxsens,
2020; Gallagher, 2014; Métais & Villalobos, 2020).
This essay is such an attempt. The topic of
this essay is the relationship between affectivity (emotion in particular) and ethics
in both Levinas and enactivism. I begin by
explicating some major points developed by
Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance
(2009) in “Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)
active approach,” which involves touching
on the concept of participatory sense-making developed by Hanne De Jaegher and
Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). I show that Levinas
is roughly consistent with these accounts
on three points: he holds a version of the
primordial affectivity thesis, according to
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which our fundamental relationship to the
world and to others is essentially affective;
he takes ethical significance to be a matter
of affective response to the other; and he
maintains that we make sense of the world
together. I then consider some difficulties
regarding Colombetti and Torrance’s conception of interaction-responsibility, based
on De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s formulation of
interaction-autonomy, and draw attention
to the role of passivity and asymmetry in
interaction. I conclude that (1) ethics does not
arise from interaction but, rather, should be
considered foundational for interaction as
such, (2) we must distinguish between a participant and observer perspective on interaction
in a way overlooked by enactivist approaches,
and (3) the very method of enactivist research
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exemplified by Colombetti and Torrance
can help make phenomenologically manifest
important insights into Levinas’ difficult
concept of “the third”.

Enactivist Ethics
Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance
(2009) draw a close connection between affectivity or, more specifically, emotions, and
ethics. Their aim is to indicate and argue for
a kind of responsibility, produced in and by
interaction, that is in excess of the actions and
intentions of individual subjects. Call this
kind of responsibility – indexed to an interaction and irreducible to individual, personal
responsibility – “interaction-responsibility.”

Emotion and Ethics
According to Colombetti and Torrance, emotions are inherently ethical, since emotions
(and affectivity in general) are value-laden.
For enactivists, organisms make sense of the
world, i.e., enact a meaningful world, in terms
of what matters to them. The traditional,
representational idea of cognition is replaced
by the enactivist idea of sense-making, which
always refers both to environmental features
and the organism’s own actions, both possible and actual, within that environment.
Emotion is just one (perhaps complex) form
of affectivity, but the more general point is
that affectivity is both central to sense-making (this claim is known as the primordial
affectivity thesis (Colombetti, 2017)) and
value-laden: the way that the world affects
the organism matters to that organism. The
bacterium, for example, makes sense of a
sugar gradiant insofar as the sugar is relevant
to the organism as food; that is, the sugar is
meaningful to the organism because it affects

1

3

the organism in a way that matters. The way
that the world affects the organism (and
vice-versa) is value-laden: features of the
environment attract and repel living beings.
In the bacterium example, sugar has a value
as food. Insofar as affectivity is a matter of
value, then, affectivity is relevant to ethics.
The claim is not that bacteria have
emotion in the same way as do humans.
Rather, emotions are typically seen as a complex form of affectivity that is likely neither
shared by all living beings nor exclusive to
humanity. However, the point remains that,
as a form of affectivity, emotions are in part
a matter of what matters to us. Something
utterly irrelevant fails to impact us at an
emotional level. We fear what is dangerous,
revel in good-fortune, and simply dismiss
the irrelevant. We can consider emotions as
a way of making sense of the world in terms
of what matters to us. Thus, emotions can be
considered as disclosing what matters.
Accordingly, Colombetti and Torrance
thus take emotions to be inherently ethical
in character: they reveal what matters to one
and thus are relevant to what one should do.
Relatedly, what one is responsible for depends
on what matters, and thus emotions can help
us to better understand responsibility.

Participatory Sense-Making
The world appears to us as always-already
mattering, always-already colored by what
matters: not as a neutral environment to be
represented, but as meaningful. We are not
only affected by impersonal nature, but also
by others, e.g., other human beings1. We act
alongside, with, for, and even through others.
We are affected by others in terms of what

I take it to be obvious that we are also affected in relevantly similar ways by certain non-human living
creatures, for instance, house-pets. For our purposes here, however, I focus on human interaction.
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matters to us, but also in terms of what matters to the other. When we interact with an
other human being, our sense-making activities – in all their cognitive/affective richness,
including our complex emotional processes –
become intertwined with those of the other.
We act and react, build and rebuild, call and
respond. Through the dynamic coupling
between myself and another person, new
meanings, i.e., new ways of understanding
the world in ways that matter to us, emerge,
meanings that would have been inaccessible
to me as an individual. The teacher-student
relationship, for instance, exemplifies this
kind of emergent meaning production, when
in the process of education both the student
and teacher learn something new. Musical
improvisation is another popular example
(e.g., Krueger, 2014) of meaning-production in
excess of individual action or intent.
This is one way of characterizing what
Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo
(2007) call “participatory sense-making.”
According to them, an interaction can take
on a life of its own, becoming itself autonomous relative to the autonomy of the agents
that otherwise constitute its existence. Call
this “interaction-autonomy.” They write,
…meaning is generated and transformed
in the interplay between the unfolding
interaction process and the individuals
engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory
sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly
the individual only. (p. 485)
Put simply, we make sense of the world
together; we make sense of ourselves and of
others together. With respect to emotions or
affectivity, which are modes of sense-making,
it is readily apparent that our emotional lives
are deeply shaped by and within interaction
with others. We get swept away by good conversation; we work each other up; seeing you

smile makes me smile; misery loves company,
and so on.
If emotions are inherently ethical and
relevant to what we should do, what we are
responsible for, and if emotions are in part
produced by interaction itself, then the
interaction itself, in excess of the individuals
engaged in it, has its own ethical significance
and its own relationship to responsibility. At
least, that is the claim made by Colombetti
and Torrance, who argue for the existence of
what I have called interaction-responsibility
along the following lines: since interaction
produces, irreducibly contributes to, or even
has its own emotional character or tone (e.g.,
a heated debate, a lovely meal, a disappointing
evening), it follows that responsibility should
not be conceived of in exclusively individual
terms; rather, it is the case that interaction
itself can bear ethical responsibility.

Levinas
Before considering Colombetti’s and
Torrance’s notion of interaction-responsibility, I turn to present some ideas and
themes from Emmanuel Levinas’ two major
philosophical texts, Totality and Infinity
and Otherwise Than Being. I do so in order
to draw connections between Levinas and
enactivism, but also to illustrate some key
differences that I will later argue allow us to
deal with some of the difficulties that arise
out of interaction-responsibility.
In Totality and Infinity (TI), Levinas
provides a narrative in which the encounter
with the face of the other disrupts an otherwise self-interested ego who exists in the
mode of enjoying the world. This disruption
corresponds to responsibility: the other
calls the ego’s right to exist into question,
demands the ego to justify its existence, its
freedom, its activity in a world that is no longer unquestionably its own. In responding to
this demand, the ego’s attention is modified
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and the world becomes thematic – signification is first and foremost a signifying of
oneself, an offering of oneself to the other,
speech or discourse, welcome and address,
and secondarily is a delivery of some content,
a formulation of the world or a giving of
bread from one’s own mouth. The ego welcomes the other, but not empty-handed.
In Otherwise Than Being (OB), Levinas
places a relationship with the other at the
very heart of subjectivity itself: the self does
not first exist in a mode of enjoyment which
is then disrupted under the weight of responsibility but, rather, the very subjectivity of
the subject is responsibility. In both cases the
analysis begins with sensibility, which in TI is
understood as enjoyment. In OB, sensibility
refers to vulnerability, exposure, subjection
to everything… equated with proximity to
a neighbor, responsibility, and substitution
of one-for-the-other. Signification is still a
central theme in this later work and here the
monstration of language in terms of saying –
an address to the other that underlies what
is said, denuding oneself in proximity, speaking, me voici – corresponding to a said – the
order of ontology, the delivery of a content or
essence – is in full swing.
Though the details of these stages
in Levinas’ thought differ, I here hope to
show that we can, in broad strokes, point
to certain features that they share and that,
again in very broad strokes, are in agreement
with enactivist thought as here considered.
Specifically, I demonstrate that Levinas and
enactivism overlap regarding primordial
affectivity (or sensibility), the ethical import
of affectivity (responsibility), and participatory sense-making (signification). Along the
way, I also emphasize two crucial differences between Levinas and enactivism: the
priority of responsibility in sense-making
and the (a)symmetry of the intersubjective
relation. The former protects us from the
illusion that Levinas is simply an enactivist,
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and the latter allows us to handle certain
problem cases that I will consider regarding
interaction-responsibility.

Primordial Affectivity – Sensibility
Levinas endorses a version of the primordial affectivity thesis, i.e., the claim that
sense-making is always, in some way, affective. In both TI and OB, Levinas is interested
in the relationship between self and other,
and approaches this relationship through
sensibility. Adriaan Peperzak (1993) writes:
While Totality and Infinity placed the
focus on the other’s visage [i.e., face],
the analyses of Otherwise Than Being
concentrate on the Self (le Soi), which
has from the beginning a special relation
to the Other. Both books are concerned
with the same relation. In the latter
work, however, it is treated within the
framework of the question, “Who am I?”
(p. 217)

In TI, the relationship with the other is
disruptive, while in OB it is constitutive (if
we can be allowed such a term) of the subject
as such. Both analyses begin with sensibility,
and in both cases sensibility is proposed
as a fundamental mode of engagement with
the world prior to intentionality (in the
Husserlian sense) or practical circumspection
(as in Heidegger).
In TI, sensibility is analyzed in terms of
enjoyment. Enjoyment refers to our affective
sensitivity to a world that matters not only
to our practical concerns – we eat to live –
but also to the fact that we take pleasure (or
pain) in the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of
our needs – we eat to live, but we also live to
eat; “we live from good soup” (Levinas, 1969, p.
110). In The Feeling Body, Colombetti calls the
inherently affective nature of sense-making
“primordial affectivity” (2017). While her
notion draws on Spinoza’s conatus and has
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obvious resonances with Heideggerian ideas
such as circumspection, mood [Stimmung],
and the translation resistant Befindlichkeit,
it can nonetheless be seen as broadly compatible with the TI account of enjoyment.
What must be made clear is that enjoyment
is not merely a matter of practical concern.
It is a point in Levinas’ favor that enjoyment,
rather than intentionality, conatus, or circumspection, can make better sense of the
phenomenologically manifest truth that we
sometimes enjoy (and sometimes especially)
that which we do not understand and even
that which is counter to survival. In this way,
sense-making is inherently affective in TI
since our primary relation to the world is one
of enjoyment, but the reverse is not true: we
sometimes enjoy non-sense; to be affected is
not, first and foremost, to be affected by or
provided with a sense.
In OB, Levinas provides a different
account of sensibility. The method of this
work makes the entire idea of “account”
problematic, however. Levinas takes TI to be
too steeped in ontological language and OB
attempts to counter this orientation through
emphatic hyperbole and equivocation.
Peperzak (1993) writes that, in OB, “signification is analyzed as proximity, proximity as
responsibility for the Other, responsibility as
substitution” and that “Most of the time, however, the various ‘moments’ are placed next to
one another, seemingly without allowing a
definite order among them” (p. 220).
Proximity – and thus responsibility and
substitution – can only be understood in
relation to sensibility. Sensibility is no longer
understood as enjoyment but, instead, as
exposure, vulnerability, subjection to everything
(Levinas, 1981, p. 14). Taking pleasure and
pain in one’s life already occurs at the level
of experience, but in OB Levinas thematizes
a sensibility irreducible to experience (ibid.,
54). Sensibility is conceived as a hyperbolic
passivity, more passive than a faculty of

receptivity that would transform its relationship with a world into an intuition or
representation. This passivity is akin to
ageing, which cannot be understood as either
a power of or faculty belonging to a subject.
Rather, a sensible being is exposed to ageing,
vulnerable, precarious and passive, subjected
to time in a way that resists an ontological
or phenomenological analysis of time as a
structure of subjectivity. Ageing is not the
experience of ageing, but a subjection to something other than experience. Sensibility thus
refers to a radical affectivity, a being affected
by a world in a way that certainly matters,
but not in a way that can be understood primarily as meaning and sense.
Sensibility in OB, then, refers to a radically passive affectivity – a being-affected
by the other which cannot be reduced to the
self, and, in the framework of OB mentioned
above, this condition of exposure is prior
to the constitution of the self as power or
force within existence. That is, this affectivity is primordial, though it does not refer
first and foremost to sense and cognition
but to subjection. Furthermore, “as a sensibly
affected body,” Peperzak writes, “one stands
in an immediate contact with one’s neighbor”
(p. 223). That is, it is as a sensible being that
I am approached by a neighbor, or that I
welcome the other. The other is “nearby”
or proximate insofar as I am unavoidably
exposed to her in sensibility. It is for this reason that sensibility is also a position of being
hostage to the other: prior to any initiative of
my own, I am exposed.
In both works, then, Levinas can be
understood as defending something like
the thesis of primordial affectivity: the
fundamental relation a being (in this case, a
human being) has to the world is one of being
affected, either by the pleasure and pain one
takes in the satisfaction of one’s own needs
or in one’s very exposure to that which is
irreducible to oneself.
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Ethical Significance – Responsibility
Furthermore, the way that we are affected
by others at the level of sensibility is of central ethical importance for Levinas, though
differing accounts of sensibility result in
different analyses here. In TI, the story is a
quite straightforward one. The ego enjoys the
world as for-itself until this naïve existence
is interrupted by the face of the other. In
expressing herself, the other calls my right to
be into question. That is, the face of the other
diverts my attention from my enjoyment of
the world – disrupts my contentment – and
commands me to justify my activity, freedom, and existence. What I should do, what
I am responsible for, is no longer merely
a matter of my own values, interests, and
actions, but also a matter of the other to
whom I am exposed. For Levinas, responsibility is not something I volunteer myself for;
rather, responsibility refers to the fact that,
in the face of an other who affects me by
expressing herself, a response is unavoidable.
I might respond verbally, by negotiating with
the other in order to balance her needs and
my own, or by “giving the bread from my
own mouth (Levinas, 1981, p. 55). I might even
choose to ignore the other entirely, but in any
case response is unavoidable: to not respond
is itself a response.
In OB, sensibility is exposure or subjection to everything. In a developmental sense,
I do not create myself but am rather brought
into existence through the other – first the
maternal other who carries me within herself, and then the others who continue to
nourish me and introduce me to an entire
world. From this perspective, my existence
is not to be understood first as a locus of
activity or even as a self-preserving conatus,
but first as exposure to the world and second
as a response to the other to whom I am
exposed. That is, my very existence consists
in response. Furthermore, uniquely human
proximity is not the proximity of spatial
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relations or perception but the proximity
accomplished by language or expression: the
other is she who speaks to me, calling me to
respond. It is as one who is held accountable,
one who is response-able, that I am individuated as me, and this individuation is the
work of the other rather than a product of
my own initiative: I am elected without my
consent. In this sense, the very subjectivity
of the subject is responsibility, as any subsequent activity on my part occurs only on the
basis of this prior summons or approach. In
TI, the encounter with the other is a usurpation – a decentering of a pre-existing ego that
enjoys its world – but in OB my relation to
the other is characterized as an inspiration
(Levinas, 1981, p. 140) – a breathing in of the
other as the air that sustains me, a suffusion
of my existence by the other in proximity, the
other-in-the-same or the same (or self) itself
constituted as being-for-the-other.
Recall that Levinas equates proximity
(which occurs at the level of sensibility) with
responsibility: my relationship to the other
is established as being called to respond to
one who affects me beyond my own activity.
Furthermore, responsibility is substitution: to
respond is to welcome the other, to open oneself, to expose oneself as exposed, to respond
for the other. On the model of language, to
speak is already to speak for the other, to
answer and be answerable. Language – and the
self constituted in language – cannot be understood as for-oneself but only as for-another.
Thus responsibility is also a foundation for
signification, as a making of signs and delivery
of content already presupposes a relationship
to the other characterized as responsibility.
Crucially, responsibility is an asymmetric relation. That is, according to Levinas,
I am always infinitely responsible for the
other, but not the other way around. My very
existence is constituted as accountability and
response. I can never absolve myself of responsibility since responsibility is subjectivity
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as such, my subjection to everything that
characterizes my very existence as a sensible
body. I am responsible even for my own persecution, even for the other’s responsibility,
as no matter what the other may do to me,
I nevertheless exist as he who must respond.
At the level of experience (understood as a
phenomenology, distinct from the level of
sensibility), we can see in intentionality and
circumspection alike a necessary relation
between that which is given to consciousness
and myself – it is always I who must respond
to the call of the other. As he states in his
interviews with Phillipe Nemo, Ethics and
Infinity, whether the other is not also responsible for me “is his affair” (Levinas, 1985, p. 98):
it is my responsibility-for-the-other and not
her-responsibility-for-me that characterizes
and permeates my existence.
In both TI and OB, the way I am affected
by the other is ethically significant or, perhaps, is ethical significance itself: my activity
takes on an ethical sense only in relation to
a prior affective relationship to the other.
In TI, affectivity is ethical because the other
affects me in such a way as to draw my attention away from my own values and towards
the other, calling my own right to be (that
is, to be-for-oneself) into question. In OB,
affectivity is ethical because my very existence is characterized by a passive relation
to the other, i.e., responsibility. Insofar as I
exist, I exist in the position of hostage as one
who must respond in some way or other to
that which affects it. To again borrow from
Peperzak:
As a sensibly affected body, one stands
in an immediate contact with one’s
neighbor, with whom one is obsessed
(AE 126-29/OB 107). As a mother, I bear
the other within me, without fusing
together (132-35/104-7). I cannot grasp
myself in thought; in saying, however,
I expose myself. (p. 223)

Participatory Sense-Making –
Signification
Third, Levinas can be seen as advocating some
version of the participatory sense-making
hypothesis. By affecting us, the other in part
constitutes our process of making sense of
the world: in TI, they disrupt an individualistic sense-making in terms of hedonic value,
and in OB they are at the very foundation of
signification as such.
According to Levinas in TI, the expression of the other is “the principle” that allows
for the mere appearances occurring to my
own subjective experience to refer beyond
myself (Levinas, 1969, p. 92). In the face of
the other, the world is no longer for-me but
for-others. Through expression, the other
thematizes the world, drawing my attention
to things that I may not have otherwise
noticed, in ways I may not have otherwise
conceived. The expression of the other can
even draw attention to what I could not have
tended to myself, given my own values and
capacities. This is the meaning of learning:
the teacher introduces something to the student that he could not have arrived himself,
an introduction of something new that he
did not already contain. A special case of this
is interpersonal creation, in which I do not
just come to recognize something new but,
rather, something new is itself produced.2
Furthermore, in response to the other, I must
formulate the world: I must come to understand the world in terms of what is relevant
in order to respond to the other.
The same structure is at play in OB,
though there it is more fleshed out. Here,
the key insight is the distinction in language
between saying and what is said. Saying is
an approach, an exposure of oneself to the
other, denuding oneself, welcoming the
other, offering oneself and one’s world to
the other; it is the one-for-the-other or signification as such, not understood as a sign
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by which I identity a content but, rather,
as the very making of signs, giving a sign of
giving signs (Levinas, 1981, p. 15). Saying always
corresponds, however, to something said, the
sign actually delivered in the act of delivering
oneself to the other. Saying is first and foremost a response to the other, but in saying
something is always said, and this something
said is directed or affected by the specific
way in which the other affects me. It is as a
response to the other that I formulate what
is said.
Consider an example. Say I am enjoying
a bowl of soup. There is a knock at my door
and when I answer it I see a child hunched
over and rubbing her belly. I must respond
to this expression in some way, and response
involves formulating a world. I may recognize that the child is hungry, but not wish
to share my food and slam the door in her
face. I might recognize she is hungry and
formulate my food as food-for-her. I might
not recognize the sign of hunger as a sign
of hunger and instead think she is sick and
offer her medicine (perhaps she will correct
me). This is an extremely simple example, but
more complex cases can be understood similarly. The other expresses herself to me and,
in responding, I must come to understand the
world in some way or other. In an exceptionally difficult moral conundrum, I may have to
reinterpret Kant or formulate a brand new
transcendental argument of my own before
deciding on a general policy, or unearth some

2
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obscure but relevant factors to be considered
by a utilitarian calculation. I may read a
cutting-edge article in Nature and have to
explicitly reformulate my conception of the
world before making my own observations,
forming my own hypotheses, testing them
and so on.
The point is that we come to understand the world by being affected by and
responding to others. The world is formed
in contact with the other, understandable on
the basis of discourse. First and foremost, I
am affected by the other at the level of sensibility by which I receive her expression prior
to any activity on my part. Saying emerges as
a response to such contact, as a giving of oneself to the other, as a concretion of responsibility. Participatory sense-making touches on
this response or level of saying insofar as it
emphasizes affectivity and the way in which
others affect and motivate (or “regulate”) me
and my behavior. However, they do not draw
a distinction between saying and what is said,
taking affectivity to be a matter of coordination between passivity and activity from the
start, and thus already equating response
with what is conveyed in it. That is, participatory sense-making provides an account of
the collaborative production of what is said,
the generation of mutual understanding or
common sense.3 Levinas makes room for this
kind of account: we indeed make sense of the
world together. What the other has to say to
me is relevant to my understanding of the

As an example, take group musical improvisation. The other with whom I play may draw my attention
to certain elements of the music, accenting certain notes or changing the entire character through
modulation. In group improvisation, I can play my instrument in ways I never would have on my own.
I may also come to realize certain musical connections that had previously gone unnoticed, or form
entirely new musical ideas in the way that a good conversation is thought provoking. And insofar as I,
the other, or the very interaction between us results in something new, something new is brought to my
awareness of the world, and this something new can impact my previous understanding. She resolves
the song in an unanticipated way that utterly reshapes the significance of the entire piece.
This is why De Jaegher and Di Paolo insist that individual autonomy is necessary for sociality, as
considered below.
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world and how the other affects me is relevant to the totality of my affective relations
to the world as large: the other can, at any
time, shake up any or every part of the world,
or the world itself. But what remains primary
is the role that passivity prior to activity
plays in such productions. What is said or
done at the level of activity is always already
a response to the other who affects me and, as
such, must be understood in an ethical sense
irreducible to my own values or established
meaning.

Enactivist Responsibility
To recap, Levinas is to some extent compatible with certain features of enactivism and
enactivist ethics. Specifically, (1) affectivity
is prioritized as not only ubiquitous to
human-being but also as a foundation of
sense-making; (2) the way in which we are
affected by others is ethically significant or,
more strongly, is ethical significance as such;
(3) we make sense of the world together, as
my understanding of the world is oriented
by the way the other affects me and my
response to that other. But in the last section
we also arrived at two important differences
between Levinas and enactivism as so-far
considered: (1) the intersubjective relationship, characterized as responsibility, is
asymmetric, insofar as affectivity is radically
passive and, accordingly, I can never do away
with my responsibility for the other while
simultaneously not supposing the other to
be responsible for me; (2) response must first
be understood in an ethical sense prior to the
generation of common meaning or accomplishment of mutual understanding, which
implies that abstract considerations resulting
from sense-making cannot absolve one of
responsibility. These last two points should be
kept in mind when considering the enactivist
conception of interaction-responsibility, as
I will argue that a Levinasian approach can
maintain key insights from enactivism while
resolving some of its tensions and difficulties.

Interaction-Responsibility
Colombetti and Torrance consider two
interactions, drawn from studies by Perrin
and May (2000), between an elderly woman
and a caregiver. The first interaction, in
which the caregiver inattentively feeds the
elderly woman while silently gazing out a
nearby window with her head in her hand,
is utterly devoid of interest, genuine engagement, and, for lack of a better term, care. The
second interaction, in which the caregiver
initiates and maintains eye-contact (the
elderly woman reciprocates), speaks softly,
and personally connects with the elderly
woman, is one with an overall tone of tender
engagement.
Colombetti and Torrance point out that
the emotional character of the interaction (i.e.,
cold detachment or tender warmth) depends
not only on each participant considered in
isolation, but also on the unfolding interaction itself. They suggest that their approach
requires two shifts, the first of which is
…to see the ethical content or valuation
of a given situation as emerging as much
from the interaction of the participants
as from the autonomous decision making
or original authorship of the participants
themselves. This shift implies a very different way in which ethical appraisal is
to be applied in such situations from the
way appraisal is conventionally applied.
It constrains us to defocus (to a greater
or lesser extent) from questions of individual responsibility, exculpation, blame
and praise, and encourages us to focus
on the ethical qualities of the interaction
itself. (2009, p. 523)
Colombetti and Torrance leverage interaction-autonomy and their close association
between autonomy and responsibility to
argue that the coldness of the first interaction
is not solely the caregiver’s responsibility. The
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coldness of the interaction is a relational fact,
and as such the interaction itself is partly ethically responsible. Put another way, responsibility is somewhere between the caregiver
and elderly woman. Indeed, to praise the second caregiver and blame the first represents a
“superficial ethical analysis” (p. 522), whereas
a sophisticated analysis would focus instead
on interaction.

to be avoided, but either more must be said
of what such a seemingly truncated ethics
and its practices would consist of, or otherwise the project and its radicality must be
clarified. A more modest suggestion is that
the interaction itself is ethically relevant and
must factor into our consideration, while
nevertheless not being a bearer of specifically
ethical responsibility.

Some Concerns

Third, assuming that the interaction
itself bears ethical responsibility for the
emotional character of the encounter, and
assuming that we can either hold interactions accountable or obviate any need for
accountability in the face of interaction-responsibility, it would seem that defocusing
from individuals, at least in the above
examples, would amount to excuse-making.
That is, in holding the interaction itself partially ethically responsible, we diminish the
burden of responsibility on – we make an
excuse for – a caregiver who arguably should
have behaved better and whom some of my
readers plausibly would hold responsible
in the more demanding sense. This tactic is
antithetical to the Levinasian claim that I am
inexorably responsible for the other. Any formulation of an excusing principle, such as the
conception of interaction-responsibility here
being considered, presupposes a relationship
of responsibility or one-for-the-other, i.e.,
saying irreducible to what is said, and thus
cannot coherently deny this responsibility in
practice. Furthermore, since the interaction
in question is in part dependent on (though
not reducible to) the actions of both the caregiver and the elderly woman, then would not
some (but not all) of the responsibility for the
interaction also fall on the elderly woman’s
actions? That is, the interaction may have a
life of its own, but this life emerges out of
the actions taken by the woman cared for as
well as the caregiver. Would not the transition from the elderly woman’s causal role in
bringing about the interaction to her (partial) ethical responsibility for the interaction

The shift to interaction-autonomy conceived
of as irreducible to the autonomy of the
agents engaged in the interaction is feasible,
but the additional step to redistributing
responsibility away from those agents to
the interaction itself is ethically untenable.
First, a backwards-facing, guilt formulation
of responsibility seems to be implied in the
quick transition from causing or bringing
about emotions, i.e., from causal responsibility for emotions, to ethical responsibility for
those emotions brought about. This may be
an unjustified transition.
Second, we do not need Levinas to tell us
that ethics is concerned, at least predominantly,
with personal responsibility. We might extend
responsibility beyond the scope of individual
human beings to animals, for example, or the
environment, but it seems strange to hold
an interaction between human beings to
itself be ethically responsible over and above
the responsibility of its participants. How
would we hold an interaction accountable,
blame or praise the interaction itself, or
demand that an interaction cultivate its own
virtues? It could perhaps be argued that the
radical nature of Colombetti and Torrance’s
suggestion consists not only in defocusing
the individual in favor of the relational
but also in the excision of concepts such as
accountability, blame, and praise from ethics
itself. If this were the case though, I contend
we would be left with something no longer
recognizable as ethics. That is not necessarily
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be permitted by the same hasty logic leading
from interaction-causality to interaction-responsibility? Bracketing that line of thinking,
it is nevertheless the case that defocusing
from individual responsibility does not mean
that individuals are in no way responsible for
the interactions they engage in, and I doubt
that Colombetti and Torrance would want
to go that far. But without going that far,
the idea of interaction-responsibility might
plausibly imply a form of victim-blaming.
This difficulty seems to emerge from considering the ethical relationship to be symmetric in the interaction, i.e., that both persons
involved bear responsibility in the same way
and only for their own deeds and the consequences thereof.

A Possible Solution
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) provide some
resources for dealing with the second and
third of these objections, and considering
their possible response can help us to better
understand Levinas’ potential contribution
to enactivist ethics as well as providing an
enactivist clarification of Levinas’ difficult
concept of the third.
For De Jaegher and Di Paolo, although
an interaction has a life of its own, i.e., its
own (interaction-)autonomy, it nevertheless
constitutionally depends on the autonomy of
the individual participants. They write:
…the autonomy of the individuals as
interactors must also not be broken (even
though the interaction may enhance or
diminish the scope of individual autonomy). If this were not so, if the autonomy
of one of the interactors were destroyed,
the process would reduce to the cognitive engagement of the remaining agent
with his non-social world. (p. 492)
We could say, then, that in the case of the
cold caregiver, since the elderly woman is

particularly vulnerable (she is institutionalized and depends on care), her autonomy has
been undermined. According to De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, maintaining that individual
autonomy is an essential condition of social
interaction, the cold interaction ceases to be
a genuine social interaction at all. In some
ways, this seems correct, as the caregiver does
not even look at or speak with (or even to)
the elderly woman, but instead mechanically
serves her food while gazing out a window,
occupied in her own world. We accordingly
cannot appeal to any higher-level interaction-autonomy to exculpate the caregiver,
since the relation between her and the elderly
woman is not really an interaction at all, in
the sense required by the concept of participatory sense-making. The “interaction”
is reduced to the caregiver’s actions, who is
then squarely responsible for how she treats
the elderly woman. In the tender interaction,
however, we can understand the caregiver
as genuinely engaging the woman she cares
for, respecting and inviting her agency and,
therefore, engaging in a social interaction
that becomes greater than the sum of its
parts. In this case, both parties are responsible since both are exercising their autonomy.
(It should be briefly noted that this kind
of solution somewhat deflates Colombetti
and Torrance’s conclusions regarding interaction-responsibility. The former kind of
“interaction,” now determined to be no genuine social interaction at all, is an important
case when thinking about ethics. Recognizing
when and how social relations go wrong,
and more specifically understanding and
responding to the ways that autonomy is
undermined by interaction, is plausibly of
utmost ethical concern.)

Rejoinder
But does this solution work in general? I am
not entirely convinced. It is incorrect to generalize the point and assert that a relation is not
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a genuinely social interaction simply because
one of the relata’s autonomy has been destroyed
or diminished. Many of history’s great, unjust,
violent social institutions have done exactly
this. On the one hand, we cannot say that for
this very reason they are not social. A social
relation is one in which two or more persons
relate (perhaps directly) to one another. We
cannot identity the violent or “anti-social”
with the non-social as such. On the other
hand, it is also not the case that these institutions or interactions simply do not constitute genuine interactions. Requiring that
each participant’s autonomy be preserved in
order for a relation to qualify as an interaction ignores the way that the other affects us
passively. This passivity has a double sense. It
is not our own action that affects us, but the
other, that is, our relationships with others
involve an element of passivity independent
of my own activity. The other also affects us
in her own passivity. To return to the example
in which the caregiver takes no interest in the
elderly woman, we can understand the very
passivity of the elderly woman, the very fact
that she is vulnerable and dependent rather
than autonomously engaged, as meaningfully
and ethically relevant to the encounter.
In The Paradox of Power and Weakness,
George Kunz (1998) calls this “the power
of weakness.” 4 Building on Levinas, Kunz
articulates the idea that the weaker the other
is, the more powerless or helpless they are,
the more dependent they are on the actions
of others, the more forceful the demands of
ethics becomes. That is, the vulnerable and
helpless other still affects us, and powerfully
if Kunz is correct. Insofar as they affect us,
the overall emotional or affective character
of the interaction is shaped by the other
herself, no matter how passive she may seem.
My point is that the other affects us by her
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mere presence, by her mere expression as an
other to which we are exposed, no matter
how autonomous and active or dependent
and passive she may be. In the very exposure
to another, a relationship is formed – a social
relationship – in which I am acted upon, a
relationship that can just as easily take on
a life of its own as one between vigorous
interlocutors. This relationship is understood
in terms of responsibility for the other who
affects us, no matter how passive; Levinas
sometimes calls responsibility “obsession”
(1981, p. 55), which requires no activity on the
part of the other, no transaction. It is easy to
find examples of people trying to help others
even when no help was explicitly requested.
The relationship has an ethical meaning
beyond either participant’s actions or intentions, and that meaning is present even if or,
better yet, especially when the other is least
autonomous. In responding to the needs of
the helpless other, we are affected by the
other and must reformulate the world, perhaps even fundamentally rearranging our
own values.
This is all to say, there is an element of
interaction that has been overlooked, complementary to participation: the way that
others affect us passively. Ethical sense-making is interpersonal but does not require that
each agent exercise their autonomy. New ethical meaning is produced in being passively
affected by the other and in responding to
the other’s needs in general, but especially
when they are at their most vulnerable and
least autonomous.

Conclusions
Enactivism conceives of sense-making as a
fundamental activity and accordingly conceives of specifically ethical sense-making in

The other aspect of the paradox is what Kunz calls “the weakness of power.”
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terms of activity. But there is another sense
of ethics that refers instead to passivity, and
ethics in this sense underlies activity as such.
This passivity has its own structure, though
not a structure understood in an ontological
way, as all ontological structures are themselves disclosed to consciousness through
activities dealing with sense. The structure
of the passivity underlying sense-making
can only be understood in an ethical sense
of a different kind, one that does not
itself depend on action but on subjection:
sense-making as an activity depends on
passivity construed as responsibility for my
neighbor. Accordingly, the enactivist conception of ethical sense-making is itself founded
on a radically passive ethical significance that
it covers up by always formulating passivity
in relation to action and autonomy.
Regarding Colombetti and Torrance’s
specific account of interaction-responsibility,
I raised three concerns: it hastily transitions
from causal to ethical responsibility; it
implies an unclear and problematic idea of
the overall project of ethics as well as ethical
practices; and it risks excusing blameworthy
action and blaming innocence. I considered
a possible response to these second and third
objections available to De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, but argued that this response ignores
that passivity structures interaction in ethically important ways. Now, I briefly propose
an alternative principle for understanding
the problem cases considered here, in a way
that will further help to bring Levinas into
enactivist discourse, and also show how the
methods of that discourse can elucidate a
difficult concept in Levinas’ own work.

Ethics of Interaction
Levinas can help us to understand that the
ethical importance of interaction cannot be
reduced to symmetric or reciprocal activity
(or any interactional domain emerging
from such activity), but must also refer to

the way I am responsible to the other prior
to any initiative of my own. As a condition
of sense-making as such, responsibility is
inexorable, inexcusable by reference to any
action I or anyone else may perform. The
difference between the two caregiver cases
considered above is not that one describes
a genuine social relation and the other does
not, nor that one features what we consider
to be morally blameworthy, and the other
praiseworthy, behavior. The difference is in
the description of the cases itself or, more
precisely, the justification that the concept of
interaction-responsibility produces.
In the case of the cold-caregiver, interaction-autonomy is leveraged to ease the
responsibility of one-for-the-other. In the
sense of TI, we can see that the caregiver
attends to her own values: her behavior is
egocentric (actively oriented by self-interest, in Kunz’ (1998) sense of the term)
while the concerned caregiver’s behavior is
alterocentric (directed by a genuine interest
in the other). But on neither the TI nor OB
accounts do these orientations or any transaction between caregiver and ward alter the
fundamental relationship of responsibility
presupposed by the activity considered and
the entire exercise of considering activity
as such. The difficulty regarding these cases
lies in providing a philosophical account
that offers irresponsibility as a solution to a
social concern. Not only is such an approach
problematic at best and incoherent at worst,
as the analysis overlooks and subsequently
denies the condition of its own claims, but
it also yields an irresponsible conception of
ethics as such.
There is truth to the enactivist position
that affectivity is ethically significant, and
also that the interaction (including its affective aspects) takes on a life of its own. In both
cases, whether the elderly woman is passive
or not, whether the caregiver is interested
or prima facie indifferent, the character of
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the relationship depends on both persons
and cannot be reduced to individual agency.
But rather than only something above individual agency, the ethical character of the
relationship depends on something below it,
something more primary than a process of
sense-making navigated by activity. Levinas
allows us to make sense of both truths or levels, complicating and enriching the conception of ethics available to enactivism: ethics
is not something produced by an interaction
but, rather, should feature in our characterization of interaction as such.
From within interaction, I am responsible for the other in such a way that this
responsibility cannot be excused nor irresponsibility ever justified: responsibility just
is the relationship I have to the other. From
outside the interaction, that is, from an
observational perspective such as the one we
have taken up here, considering interactions
as evidence, examples, or experiments for
making a philosopher’s point, the situation
is somewhat different. From within, we say
or do, we live, suffer, and respond. From
outside, we judge, praise, blame, and so
forth. That is, from outside the interaction
we engage in all those practices ordinarily
associated with ethics and morality. From
this perspective, Kunz’s analysis of the power
of weakness is compelling. It is because the
elderly woman is vulnerable, dependent, in a
certain sense weak that we demand a better
response from the caregiver. On the face of
it – but not for that reason superficial! - the
most salient concern from outside the interaction is whether the caregiver adequately
responds to the person she cares for, whether
the primary activity of the interaction is forthe-self or for-the-other. This brings me to
my final point.

Elucidation of Levinas’ ‘Third’
I want to comment on the very method of
Colombetti and Torrance’s Emotion and
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Ethics, as well as the method employed by
myself here. Perrin and May’s examples and
their take-up by Colombetti and Torrance
are compelling. Indeed, at my first exposure
to them I must admit I had an immediate
reaction: something has gone wrong in
this first case; the caregiver is neglectful,
uncaring, wrong. The more I consider the
example, the more I recognize that any one
of a million possibilities could undermine
this perhaps rash judgment. Perhaps this
kind of disconnect can even be considered a
cost of some kind, necessary for carrying out
this kind of work day after day. Nevertheless,
my quick judgment (which was no doubt
shared by at least some readers) or, more
interestingly, that such a judgement was
made at all, regardless of its content, I think
points to something important. We cannot
be indifferent to relationships between
others. Those relationships, like the singular
other, affect us in our passivity in their own
way. These examples can thereby help us to
better understand Levinas’ difficult concept of “the third.” According to Levinas, I
owe the other everything; responsibility is
infinite. But once there is an other other, that
is, at the appearance of a third outside the
relationship between myself and the other, I
must begin to compare, judge, adjudicate. I
must determine what to do for one, and what
to do for the other as well. On the basis of
my infinite responsibility to each, I cannot
ethically remain indifferent to the relationship between them. I cannot, for example,
countenance apparently unjustified cruelty
or violence or neglect. It is with the appearance of the third, then, that we enter into the
business of establishing norms, principles,
and laws. Here, mutual activity and the recognition of passivity are both crucial.

one reads the example of the indifferent
caregiver, one has a reaction of some kind
– dismay, upset, anger, disappointment,
sympathy, resignation, acceptance – which
includes at least some emotional elements. In
this way, emotion raises the ethical question,
indicating it at an intuitive level and making
phenomenologically manifest the ethical
impossibility of being entirely indifferent to,
utterly unaffected by, relationships between
others. This is, I think, a central thrust of
Levinas’ conception of the third, and one that
enactivism, with its broadly phenomenological method and emphasis on interpersonal
relationships, is well positioned to elucidate.

Colombetti and Torrance’s examples are
not just illustrative of certain interactional
emotional tonalities and their relevance
for ethics; they also produce an emotional,
ethical reaction in sensitive readers. When
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